As mainland China's inflationary spiral accelerated in [1947][1948][1949] there was a massive outflow of funds to the island of Taiwan. The exporting of China's hyperinflation was facilitated by the fixed, overvalued, exchange rate between the mainland Chinese currency and the Taiwanese currency that was adopted in August 1948. Empirical tests offer support for the importance of the 1948 monetary policy reform and suggest a substantial impact of capital inflows and excess money growth in mainland China on inflationary pressures in Taiwan. We find no independent role for Taiwanese money growth in the inflation process.
1
There is a large literature on the international transmission of inflation under fixed exchange rates. In the Bretton Woods era, for example, with the US dollar serving as the reserve currency, the United States was able to export inflation as other member countries absorbed the outflow of funds triggered by excess US money supply growth.
1 By May 1971 the persistent outflow had reached overwhelming proportions, prompting other Bretton Woods members to close their foreign exchange markets and end their support of the fixed exchange rate with the US dollar (Schwartz, 1983) . But the inflationary effects of the outflow of funds form the United
Sates pale against the outflow from mainland China to Taiwan Massive budget deficits and increasing reliance on the printing press are familiar ingredients of 2 hyperinflation and all are clearly evident in the Nationalist Chinese case (see Table 1 ). But the inter-relationship between inflation in mainland China and inflation in Taiwan, which was returned to Nationalist control by the Japanese on November 1, 1945, is a unique element not mirrored -as far as we are aware -in any other hyperinflation episode. Taiwan's resources and the Bank of Taiwan's printing press were used to help finance the Nationalist war effort.
Moreover, the Bank of Taiwan was forced to accept the depreciating Nationalist currency and exchange it for the separate Taiwanese currency at an overvalued rate --thereby further fueling overall monetary expansion and inflationary pressures on Taiwan. This exporting of hyperinflation to Taiwan leaves the policies of Chiang Kai-shek with the dubious, and quite possibly unique, honor of being responsible not just for one hyperinflation but rather for two.
There is little empirical evidence on how Taiwan's inflation was affected by events on the mainland. As far as we are aware, the only formal tests on this issue are those of Lin and Wu (1989) , who find that mainland inflation (as measured by the inflation rate in Shanghai) Grangercauses Taiwanese inflation over the January 1946-April 1949 period. 2 In this paper, we seek to re-examine the importance of the mainland Chinese variables to Taiwan's inflation and also allow for the effects of the capital inflow from mainland China to Taiwan over the 1947 to 1949 period. Finally, we test for a structural break following the monetary reform in mainland China in August 1948 that is thought to have spurred capital inflows and inflationary pressures in
Taiwan. 3 The acceleration in Taiwanese prices following this reform is evident in Figure 1 Taiwan was authorized by the Nationalist Government to issue a new local currency called the "taipi", in an amount of 5.3 billion yuan. There were no reserves for the taipi and the circulation of the taipi was limited to Taiwan. In addition, the issuance of taipi was subject to Nationalist government approval. Makinen and Woodward (1989, p. 91) state that, after this point, "the public finance practices of the Taiwanese government paralleled those on the mainland in that a major source of revenue was derived from the inflation tax." Not only did the Bank of Taiwan face the huge burden of financing the expenses of both new governments (the Taiwanese Provincial and the Nationalist government on the mainland) but also loans to the government were augmented by unsecured loans to state-owned enterprises (Lin and Wu, 1989, pp. 932-933) . 4 Fueled also by rising military spending, the budget deficit rose from 29 thousand billion fapi in 1947 to 425 thousand billion fapi in January-July 1948 (see Table 1 ).
This deficit was financed primarily by money creation, and In August 1948, the Minister of Finance announced that the budget deficit "would be reduced from 70 per cent to 30 per cent of government expenditure" (Chang, 1958, p. 80 While deposits in private banks in Shanghai initially rose after the reform and velocity of circulation of money declined, Chang (1958, p. 274) states that by the end of October the index of the note issue was four and a half times that of August, price and wage ceilings were in the process of disintegration, and it was abundantly clear that inflation could no longer be contained by the expedient of the currency change ... In November the value of checks cleared in Shanghai rose to more than three times the note issue, and the velocity of circulation of money jumped nearly six times the October figure . .. The black-market rate of interest leapt to 120 per cent per month ...
Besides simply unloading unwanted gold yuan notes by purchasing goods and services, mainland Chinese sought to transfer funds to South China en transit to Hong Kong. 5 But the exchange rate arrangements adopted in August 1948 also gave a special impetus to capital flight to Taiwan. Prior to August 19, the exchange rate system adopted between the fapi and taipi currencies was an adjustable (or managed) exchange rate system. On August 18, 1948, the exchange rate between these two currencies was 1:1635 (one taipi was equal to 1635 fapi). On August 19, 1948 , the exchange rate between the gold yuan notes and fapi was set at 1:3,000,000
(one gold yuan note was equal to 3 million fapi). The official exchange rate between the taipi and the gold yuan note thus became 1835:1 (1835 taipi equal to one gold yuan note).
With the official exchange rate between the gold yuan and the taipi held unchanged in spite of the growing loss of confidence in the gold yuan, the attraction of exchanging gold yuan for taipi was obvious. The accelerating net capital inflows into Taiwan after the August 1948 7 reform are depicted in Figure 2 . Perhaps reflecting the fact that the "failure of the monetary reform seemed to be anticipated by the public" (Li and Wu, 1997, p. 7) , the net capital inflow between August and October 1948 was equivalent to 95,981 million taipi. This capital inflow was the major force causing the money supply to double over this same period, accounting for 86.8% of the M1 money supply increase in September 1948 and 97.9% of the October increase (Lin and Wu, 1989, pp. 935-36) . The Bank of Taiwan stopped accepting deposits in gold yuan notes from the mainland on October 23, 1948 and, on November 1, 1948, the Nationalist government belatedly adjusted the exchange rate between the taipi and the gold yuan. The official rate was re-set at 1:1000 --that is, one taipi was equal to 1000 gold yuan notes. Also, the exchange rate was now allowed to change more often in response to market forces. The exchange rate adjustment was accompanied by a capital outflow that grew 8.8-fold between October and November 1948 and created the first net capital outflow since the August 1948 reform was enacted. Deflation of -9.5 % was recorded in December 1948, showing how surprisingly sensitive inflation rates were to the Nationalist government's exchange rate policy.
Taiwan's respite at the end of 1948 was short lived, however. Capital flight to Taiwan reaccelerated in the face of the Nationalists' crumbling position on the mainland and the Nationalist government itself began to transfer its remaining resources to Taiwan. In the face of the mounting deficits on the mainland, the 2 billion yuan maximum for the gold yuan notes was formally set aside on November 11, 1948. 6 Meanwhile the price controls in Shanghai unraveled during the middle of October 1948 in the midst of panic buying when retailers "withheld their goods from sale rather than sell them at official prices, and even the restaurants refused to do business" (Chang, 1958, p. 80 
EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE 9
The underlying data on the Taiwanese money supply and the Taipei wholesale price index are drawn from Liu (1970) . Given that, during this period, currency was apparently "the only means of payment in retail business in Taiwan" (Liu, 1970, p. 24n) , we attach more significance to the net currency measure of the money supply than to the broader M1 measure. 9 The data on capital inflows into Taiwan from mainland China are given by Lin and Wu (1989, p. 934) . The mainland Chinese money supply and inflation series are based on the currency and Shanghai wholesale price data provided by Quddus, Liu and Butler (1989) . None of the series on inflation, money growth and capital inflows is subject to unit roots. The presence of unit roots is rejected at the 99% confidence level when we allow for up to three autoregressive factors in an application of the Augmented Dickey-Fuller test.
Taiwanese inflation and money growth are regressed on their own past values, past values of mainland Chinese money growth and inflation, and the level of capital inflows. This allows us to assess the relative importance of domestic and external monetary conditions to the hyperinflation process in Taiwan. We also examine the determination of the capital inflows themselves and regress the inflows on the difference between mainland Chinese and Taiwanese money growth and inflation rates. Increases in these inflation and money growth differentials could be expected to fuel capital outflows from mainland China to Taiwan through increasing the degree of overvaluation of the gold yuan exchange rate. According to the literature on exchange market pressure (see, for example, Girton and Roper, 1977; Burdekin and Burkett, 1990) , excess money growth and excess inflation in mainland China vis-à-vis Taiwan should be reflected in some combination of currency depreciation and international reserve losses. If the exchange rate is held constant, loss of international reserves, or capital outflow from mainland China, becomes the only outlet for the exchange market pressure. A number of Latin American countries experienced this phenomenon in the run-up to the debt crisis of the 1980s, where "the general tendency toward overvaluation fueled massive capital flight ... In country after country, the public speculated against the central bank by acquiring foreign exchange and moving it abroad" (Edwards, 1995, p. 23 ).
The exact lag order of the variables in the inflation, money growth and capital inflow regressions is selected -from a maximum of four lags -according to the Akaike information criterion (AIC). We also allow for the presence of contemporaneous values of the right-handside variables. All estimation is performed over monthly data from 1947 through April 1949
(the last month prior to the fall of Shanghai). We test for shifts in the relationships at the time of the August 19, 1948 reform in mainland China and, given evidence that such a shift occurred, reestimate the equations with the sample truncated at July 1948.
The results for the Taiwanese inflation and money growth are presented in has a negative sign, a Wald test confirms an overall positive effect that is significant at better than the 1% level. Finally, the first lag of Taiwanese money growth becomes significant at least at the 11% level over the pre-August 1948 period.
The Table 2 results clearly support an important role for capital inflows in the Taiwanese inflation process. An important motivation behind these capital flows was undoubtedly flight from the political and military risks on the mainland to the relative safety of Taiwan. But these capital inflows were also likely responsive to exchange rate overvaluation associated with any worsening of inflationary pressures in mainland China over and above the levels prevailing in Taiwan. Accordingly, we next examine whether the volume of inflows can be explained by the differential between mainland Chinese and Taiwanese money growth and inflation rates. We would expect any such relationship to be strongest over the post-July 1948 period -during which the rate of exchange between the taipi and the new gold yuan was fixed notwithstanding a tremendous surge of inflationary pressure on the mainland. In Table 3 , we examine the effects An important qualification to all the above results is the fact that even our "full sample" comprises little more than two year's worth of data. Nevertheless, the findings do most consistently point to the importance of mainland Chinese monetary variables and capital inflows as determinants of Taiwanese money growth and inflation during the "twilight period" of Nationalist rule on the mainland. The suggested endogeneity of the Taiwanese variables to the mainland Chinese "forcing variables" receives further confirmation if, following Lin and Wu (1989) , we apply Granger-causality tests to our set of five variables (allowing for two lags on each). 15 The causality test results are shown in Table 4 and are in line with the inferences drawn from Makinen and Woodward (1989) and Quddus, Liu and Butler (1989) based on their bivariate causality testing with these two variables. 16 This is also consistent with the potential feedback from inflation to future rates of money growth in high inflation episodes emphasized by Sargent and Wallace (1973) . Surprisingly Lin and Wu (1989) reach opposite conclusions even though their approach is seemingly more similar to ours than to Makinen and Woodward (1989) and Quddus, Liu and Butler (1989) 
CONCLUDING COMMENTS
The importance of mainland China's inflationary process to Taiwan's own hyperinflation has received surprisingly little recognition in the academic literature. Yet this episode seems to be a textbook case of the exporting of inflation from the fading Nationalist regime on the mainland to their new power base on Taiwan. This process was facilitated by the fixed, and overvalued, rate of exchange for the new gold yuan against the Taiwanese taipi that was adopted in August 1948. The inflationary spiral in Taiwan continued into 1950, when it was finally stopped with the help of a deposit program designed to draw currency out of circulation and with the arrival of US aid (see, for example, the discussion and references in Burdekin and Whited, 2001 ). Meanwhile, the last Nationalist forces outside Taiwan were evacuated from the Choushan Islands on May 17, 1950.
FOOTNOTES

3.
The inflationary consequences were, however, mitigated by central banks' ability to sterilize the effects of the international reserve flows on the money stock (Laney and Willett, 1982) .
4.
Meanwhile, Lin and Wu (1989) , Makinen and Woodward (1989) , and Quddus, Liu and Butler (1989) all test causality between money growth and inflation in Taiwan but Lin and Wu's conclusions are opposite to the other two studies.
3.
Regarding the importance of this reform to the inflation process on the mainland, Quddus, Liu and Butler (1989) find that truncating the sample period at August 1948
eliminates the bi-directional feedback between inflation and money growth in mainland
China that applies if the sample is extended into 1949 (see also Tang and Hu, 1983) .
Meanwhile, our own prior univariate analysis of inflation and the growth rates of nominal and real money balances in Taiwan over the 1945-1953 period (Burdekin and Whited, 2001) suggests that the August 1948 reform coincides with the beginnings of an extended period of instability in Taiwanese currency and inflation processes that continues into 1949 and 1950. 4. The area of circulation of the fapi also was reduced as local Communist currency was issued in its stead. Hsia (1953, pp. 73-74) details ten different currencies circulating in the Communist-controlled areas in January 1948.
5.
The total capital flight from China to Hong Kong between 1947 and 1949 has been estimated at around HK$500 million (Chang, 1958, p. 320 8.
There was a subsequent ten-fold increase in Shanghai wholesale prices after the Communist takeover before stabilization was finally achieved in March 1950 (see Burdekin and Wang, 1999) . While Nationalist forces remained on the field in mainland China until 1950 , Chou (1963 states that after the fall of Shanghai "the gold yuan notes were rejected by the public." Attempts to replace the gold yuan notes with a new "silver yuan" standard on July 1, 1949 were an utter failure. Reportedly, the budget deficit in the second half of 1949 totaled 88% of expenditures--a deficit that "had to be met with gold, silver, and foreign exchange since bank notes no longer enjoyed the people's acceptance" (Chang, 1958, p. 169) .
9.
As with Makinen and Woodward (1989) , Quddus, Liu and Butler (1989) and Burdekin and Whited (2001) , our currency series does not include the emergency money that was issued in 1948 and 1949 . As the reported emergency money is only 2% of other currency in June 1949 and less than 1% in December 1948 (Chen, 1955, p. 87) , it is unlikely that excluding this emergency money has any major effect on the results.
10.
Besides capital inflows, the addition of contemporaneous values of the other variables was always rejected on the basis of an F-test.
11.
Additional lagged values of the variables included in the equations were used to form the instruments in the 2SLS estimation. In the inflation equation the instrument were lags two through four of Chinese inflation, Chinese money growth and capital inflows. In the money growth equation the instruments were lags three through five of Taiwanese money growth, Chinese money growth and capital inflows.
12.
While it is far from ideal to apply GMM to such a small sample as this, the results for the 1947:6-1949:4 period actually seem to be quite robust to the estimation procedure employed. The application of 2SLS, for example, has no effect on the signs and significance levels of the coefficients reported in Table 2 . The results for the 1947:6-1948:7 sub-sample are not as consistent, however, and the right-hand-side variables there are generally not statistically significant under 2SLS estimation -the only exception being that the lagged capital inflow remains significant at approximately the 7% level.
13.
Simply adding a dummy variable defined as one for the post-July 1948 period and zero otherwise did not capture the source of the instability and, when such a dummy was added to either the inflation, money growth, or capital inflow equation, it was always insignificant. This suggests that any instability is reflected more in the slope coefficients but, at the same time, there were insufficient degrees of freedom to add further dummies.
We also could not sensibly estimate over the post-1948 period alone and, as it is, the pre-August 1948 estimates cannot be considered anything more than suggestive given that they use barely more than a year's worth of data.
14.
Application of a Wald test showed the overall positive effect to be significant only at approximately the 13% level. There are also partially offsetting effects for the capital inflows variable but neither of the negative coefficients on the lagged terms is significant Our procedure differs from that of Lin and Wu (1989) , however, in that they did not allow for the role of capital inflows and hence considered only a four-variable system.
16. Makinen and Woodward (1989) Chang (1958, pp. 16, 40, 51, 71, 84, 124, 168) , Wu (1958, p. 122) and authors' calculations. 1947:6-1949:4 1947:6-1948:7 1947:6-1949:4 1947:6-1948 The numbers in parentheses after the independent variables denote the lag order (if any), ***, **,* and # denote significance at the 1%, 5%, 10% and 11% levels, respectively, t-statistics are listed in parentheses below each coefficient, GMM denotes Generalized Method of Moments and 2SLS denotes Two-Stage Least Squares, J-Statistic is a goodness of fit diagnostic for GMM regressions for which R 2 s and F-Statistics cannot be computed (the lower the value of the J-Statistic the better the fit), and the Chow Breakpoint Test is for a hypothesized structural break at the time of the monetary reform in August 1948. 
